Embracing Nuclear Taboo

Introduction

Deterrent strategies seek to discourage or prevent certain outcomes; evidently, the outcome(s) in the nuclear case are extraordinarily severe – hence, nuclear deterrence strategies must be highly effective and morally robust. States adopting the Indecisive Strategy overtly proclaim ambiguity in order to deter other states from deploying nuclear weapons. This essay will begin with further exposition of this strategy, before demonstrating that it cannot be morally justified. I ground this conclusion upon two claims:

1) The Indecisive Strategy is vulnerable to Stevenson’s (1986) ‘failure-to-rule-out’ objection.

2) It would be morally unjustified for states to adopt the Indecisive Strategy when a morally superior strategy is available, namely Embracing Nuclear Taboo.

Finally, two possible critiques to claim (2) will be considered – I hope to explain why these critiques do not undermine the Embracing Nuclear Taboo strategy.

The Indecisive Strategy

The Indecisive Strategy seeks to deter by deliberately creating ambiguity/uncertainty among their adversaries (Baylis, 1995, pp.6-7). Stevenson outlines how a state might go about this: in “the case where the agent has not decided what he would actually do in conditions C [adversary initiates nuclear attack], but says to himself and others ‘if conditions C come about, then I may do ⱷ [retaliate with nuclear force] – do not rule out my doing ⱷ’” (Stevenson, 1986, p.200; brackets added). In other words, states may intentionally avoid deciding whether they would retaliate if struck first, and openly proclaim this indecision. How does this indecision deter adversaries? Clearly, states are responsible for protecting their people from certain harm. But, likewise, it is highly intuitive to suggest that states also are responsible for protecting their people against the risk of harm (McMahan, 1985, pp.534-536). Even if adversary states believed that the likelihood of ⱷ was low in conditions C, the fact that ⱷ’s consequences are so catastrophic surely puts their populations at unacceptable risk. Schelling holds that “deterrence has to be understood in relation to uncertainty” (Schelling, 1966, p.97); this explains why nuclear deterrence strategies “that leave something to chance” (e.g. the “brinkmanship” of the Cuban Missile Crisis (Schelling, 1966, p.99)) may have promising potential.[1]

Let us examine a notable appeal of the Indecisive Strategy. By comparison, consider the conventional threat strategy wherein states threaten their adversaries like so: ‘if conditions C come about, then we will retaliate ⱷ’. A key critique of this conventional threat is that it violates the ‘Wrong Intentions Principle’. Kavka summarises this eloquently: “to intend to do what one knows to be wrong is itself wrong” (1978, p.289). In the same way that acts can possess immoral content, perhaps the development of certain intentions can be immoral (Dworkin, 1985, p.447). Although there is room to resist the Wrong Intentions Principle (Kemp, 1987, pp.288-289; Kavka, 1978, p.290-291), it certainly represents a notable challenge to the conventional threat strategy: both its intuitive appeal and the support from deontological and consequentialist camps (Kemp, 1987, p.276) confirm this assessment.

Therefore, the flagship strength of the Indecisive Strategy is that it circumnavigates the Wrong Intentions Principle altogether: deterrents which rely on uncertainty are “often so credible” because “they do not need depend on a willingness to commit anything like [nuclear M.A.D.] suicide in the face of a challenge” (Schelling, 1966, p.97). The Indecisive Strategist does not express problematic unambiguous intent: its deterrent relies upon ambiguity and the lack of explicit intent.

Thus far, the Indecisive Strategy seems acceptable: it creates nuclear deterrent while avoiding the notable moral critique that is the Wrong Intentions Principle. However, the next section of this essay provides two claims which demonstrate that the Indecisive Strategy is not morally justified.

Claim 1: The ‘Failure-to-Rule-Out’ Objection

My first claim directly relies on the work of Leslie Stevenson (1986), who presents a simple yet valuable objection to the Indecisive Strategy. Simply put, if a state is discussing its nuclear capacities, we expect more than ambiguity. States ought to outwardly condemn the deplorable nature of nuclear deployment, rather than entertain it as a viable option through apathetic uncertainty:

“We must ask… 'Is there anything you would rule out from consideration, on moral grounds, even in conditions C?'” (Stevenson, 1986, p.200)

In fact, if a state explicitly fails to rule out certain actions, this could very reasonably be interpreted as implied condonement. A similar critique appears in Paskins and Dockrill’s claim that there is a “moral discomfort” associated with the notion that a nuclear power such as NATO would remain indecisive, rather than make a pre‑emptive pledge against nuclear deployment (Paskins, 1979, p.69).

Analogously, consider that Donald Trump’s recent failure to condemn the white supremacist group ‘Proud Boys’ received international criticism, being described as “dangerous” and “catastrophic” (Guardian, 2020). Angela Davis’ iconic and pertinent statement captures the essence of objections of this sort: “it is not enough to be non-racist, we must be anti-racist” (1979). When addressing incredibly immoral actions, such as racism or nuclear attack, we ought to go beyond the moral neutral ground of indecision. When agents intentionally omit condemnation of immorality, they have morally failed.

Claim 2: Embracing Nuclear Taboo

A second claim supports my rejection of the Indecisive Strategy: a morally superior strategy ought to be adopted instead – Embracing Nuclear Taboo. Nuclear Taboo as a phenomenon has received notable attention from historians and political scientists, with Nina Tannenwald at the forefront (1999, 2005, 2007, 2018). I develop my account assuming the empirical veracity of these empirical analyses: Tannenwald’s findings are “comprehensive” (Rappert, 2009, p.183), “thoughtful”, and “prodigious” in their depth of research (Liberman, 2008, p.716). The following section of this essay seeks to demonstrate how a behaviour, namely embracing the nuclear taboo system, can be endorsed as an ethically watertight nuclear deterrence strategy.

A taboo is an unwritten/unspoken social contract of rules that regulate human behaviour (Colding, 1997, p.1). Taboos come in various forms. Some represent little more than tradition – widespread “complicity” in bizarre and irrational beliefs (Douglas, 2002, p.xiii), often noted for their “lack of moral or ethical content” (Tannenwald, 2007, p.59). The nuclear taboo represents precisely the contrary: Tannenwald consistently affirms that “the nuclear taboo is a de facto non-use norm with a strong moral component” (ibid.). The nuclear taboo provides a strong deterrent effect: with the convictions of domestic citizens, the international community, and the state leaders themselves shaped by the taboo (Tannenwald, 2007, p.47), state leaders are compelled from all angles to understand nuclear deployment as indisputably unacceptable. The nuclear taboo captures the “axiomatic” (Schelling, 2000, p.10) ubiquity of nuclear opposition: inhibitions on nuclear weapons become “confidently shared common knowledge” (ibid., p.12). Clearly, nuclear taboo has a “regulative effect” upon those in control of nuclear weapons, but its “constitutive effect” also establishes a system of normative relations between states (Tannenwald, 2007, pp.44-45). In sum, the deterrent created by a system of states embracing nuclear taboo is very forceful. Moreover, in similar fashion to the indecisive strategy, the taboo strategy achieves deterrent without a conventional threat – states that embrace a nuclear taboo will not declare ‘if conditions C, we will retaliate ⱷ’. Therefore, the Wrong Intentions Principle poses no challenge.

At this stage, a very legitimate question may be asked of this Embracing Nuclear Taboo strategy: why doesn’t Stevenson’s ‘failure-to-rule-out’ objection undermine the taboo strategy in the same way it undermines the Indecisive Strategy? To answer this question, let us take a closer look at behavioural norms within taboo systems.

In taboo systems, certain principles become fundamental. Crucially, the “normative inhibitions” that constitute the taboo take on the quality of “taken-for grantedness” (Tannenwald, 2007, p.50). Decisionmakers share these “deeply embedded” tacit assumptions (ibid.). Further, this crucial characteristic of taboo is only entrenched deeper with the passage of time; the endurance of taboo eventually renders criticism unspeakable (Douglas, 2002, p.xiii). Note that in my presentation of Stevenson’s objection, I provided a crucial prefacing qualification: if a state is discussing its nuclear capacities, we expect explicit ruling-out, rather than mere indecisiveness. In the context of a taboo system, this preface qualification is not met – thus, Stevenson’s objection does not apply to nuclear taboo contexts. But suppose we nonetheless attempted to apply Stevenson’s objection to a taboo system: a state, out of nowhere, breaches the taboo and declares, “we will not deploy nuclear weapons on you”. This would certainly be peculiar. Further, this breach of taboo may appear threatening. By analogy, I would be a concerned passenger if my taxi driver, out of nowhere, suddenly declared “I am not going to drive on the other side of the road”. These ruling-out style statements, those which we expect in the indecisive case, seem problematic in contexts wherein “no one need talk about” (Tannenwald, 2007, p.50) the principles at hand. Indeed, breaching taboos “may cause danger… if the taboo supports morality or propriety” (Douglas, 2002, p.xii). In summary, I believe that Embracing Nuclear Taboo creates an effective deterrent, while avoiding the two significant moral objections I have considered (Wrong Intentions Principle and Stevenson’s failure-to-rule-out objection). The moral attractiveness of this strategy renders the Indecisive Strategy unviable.

Critique 1: Pluralism against taboo

A first possible angle of critique against Embracing Nuclear Taboo suggests the following: assuming the desirability of pluralism within democratic societies, no political principles should become inscrutable – surely, impartial pluralist discourse relies upon the rejection of such unspeakable axioms. Isiah Berlin’s pluralism rests on the “courage” required to embrace “doubts and uncertainties” (Berlin, 2008, p.296).

However, the utter force and ubiquity of morally opposition to nuclear deployment seems to justify the axiomatic principles of nuclear taboo. Political pluralism can be respected without opening the door to moral absurdity. Berlin is correct that critical discourse is essential in maintaining freedom, but I only consider such pluralist discourses necessary in contexts where a recognisable debate can be identified. I have assumed that nuclear warfare is undebatabley undesirable – therefore, the pluralist objection does not undermine the Embracing Nuclear Taboo strategy.

Critique 2: The Problem of Taboo-Breakers

A second critique, perhaps weightier, suggests that the taboo system is threatened detrimentally by taboo-breakers. Anomalies cannot be ignored (Tannenwald 2018 evaluates the strength of the contemporary nuclear taboo). The nuclear activities of Iran and North Korea have caused international commotion, conspicuously breaching the taboo – does this represent a problem for the Embracing Nuclear Taboo deterrent strategy? I believe not.

Firstly, note that these anomaly cases of taboo-breaking will not cause a ‘domino-effect’ that threatens the global stability of the nuclear taboo. As prior noted, some taboos can be understood as simply widespread “complicity” in outlandish or irrational beliefs; it is these types of “convention-dependent” or “traditional” taboo (Tannenwald, 2005, pp.37-38) that are vulnerable to being unravelled once a taboo‑breaker exposes their shaky foundations. On the contrary, the foundational moral principles of the nuclear taboo are steadfast. Therefore, “the violation [of the nuclear taboo] by one party does not necessarily constitute permission for violations by others” (ibid).

Second, I believe that an optimistic view of an international community of states helps tackle the problem of rogue taboo-breakers. Kim (2019) presents a pragmatic breakdown of the effectiveness of UN sanctions in dealing with problematic nuclear states. He presents a three-phase sequential model through which sanctions may effectively counter nuclear taboo-breakers. This analysis is not blind optimism: Kim recognises that measures may create a “vicious and unending cycle” of sanctions and nuclear tests, as seen in North Korea (p.96). So, there may be execution failures, but this is primarily the concern of political scientists and diplomats. An optimistic view, one that assumes successful execution, can rely on the undeniably positive potential of sanctions; Iran represents a paradigm example (Kim, 2019, pp.103-114; BBC, 2019). The high potential of international sanctions to counter the problematic nature of nuclear taboo-breakers maintains the viability of Embracing Nuclear Taboo against this second critique.

Conclusion

This essay has made the case that a nuclear deterrent strategy based on indecisiveness is not acceptable. Firstly, I claimed that in its attempt to avoid the Wrong Intentions Principle, it is vulnerable to Stevenson’s failure-to-rule-out objection: when discussing their nuclear capacities, states ought to go beyond the neutrality of ambiguity – states should outwardly condemn nuclear deployment. My second claim presented an alternative strategy, Embracing Nuclear Taboo. The attractiveness of this approach represents a compelling contrast to the indecisiveness strategy: it maintains deterrent, while avoiding both the Wrong Intentions Principle and Stevenson’s objection. Two additional critiques were put forward and responded to: neither pluralism nor rogue taboo-breakers undermine the Embracing Nuclear Taboo strategy.

Notes

[1] Note that a bluff (wherein a non-nuclear state pretends to possess nuclear weapons) is not a feature of the Indecisive Strategy. Although a non-nuclear state may adopt both bluffing and indecisive strategies, this represents a separate kind of case that this essay sets aside.

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