Epistemic Injustice in Global Cultural Heritage

Introduction

This essay explores the relationship between epistemic injustice and cultural heritage with a focus on the Eurocentric historiography. The past is vitally important to human social existence. Informing the development of personal and communal identities, “[h]eritage underpins and enriches continuities with those who came before and those who will come after us” (Lowenthal, 2011, p.159). Thus, heritage’s transgenerational pertinence demands ethical conduct.

Section 1 defines cultural heritage and epistemic injustice, highlighting their relationship. Section 2 diagnoses how Eurocentric narratives – built on colonial legacy – marginalise cultures through anachronism; the unilinear Western historiography excludes the ‘other’. Relegating non-European cultures outside the dominant temporality produces an epistemic injustice, undermining equality during global cultural heritage processes: I use the case study of UNESCO heritage sites. Section 3 considers potential remedies. Although ‘universality’ and ‘alterity’ strategies are problematic, a middle-ground seems effective: a pluralist ethic balances commonality with difference and promotes inclusive dialogue. Thematic exhibitions exemplify this solution.

Section 1 – Cultural Heritage & Epistemic Justice

Cultural heritage is a “broad and nebulous” concept whose definition and meaning are contested among heritage ethicists (Matthes, 2018, §1). Conventionally understood, cultural heritage is “something handed down; …cultural manifestations are legacies from our ancestors” (Prott & O’Keefe, 1992, p.311).

Since the themes of this essay have global scope, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) is centre-stage, seeking “the identification, protection and preservation of cultural and natural heritage around the world” (UNESCO, no date). UNESCO’s stewardship over extensive and diverse cultural artefacts is purportedly justified with the claim that certain sites, namely those in the World Heritage List, possess “cultural and/or natural significance… that transcend[s] national boundaries and [is] of common importance for present and future generations of all humanity” (UNESCO, 2012, p.14).

Pantazatos’ model of ethical museum trusteeship can be applied to heritage institutions more broadly: they are ethically responsible for actively overseeing the “transit” of artefacts between generations, “securing that object’s significance” (2016, pp.179-189). Here we see how “heritage is inevitably arbitrated and regulated” by “Authorised Heritage Discourse (AHD)”, governed by institutions such as UNESCO and ICOMOS (Smith, 2006; Smith, 2010, pp.63-64). This reflects Laurajane Smith’s more nuanced understanding that “heritage is not a ‘thing’ but a process” facilitated through institutions. Since historical knowledge is not “frozen”, ‘heritage’ is a verb – to make and negotiate the “meanings and value” of cultural elements through time (Pantazatos, 2017, p.373; Smith, 2010, p.63). As “social practice”, it constitutes group identity and organises social relations (Smith, 2010, p.63). Understanding cultural heritage as a process recognises that artefacts “are not themselves ‘heritage’, but rather theatres or sites of memory” (Smith, 2010, p.63).[1]

Next, I introduce epistemic injustice. Miranda Fricker is seminal to feminist social epistemology, demonstrating how “epistemic subjects are socially constituted individuals who stand in relations of power” (Fricker, 1998, p.159). “Rational authority” – a person’s actual competence and trustworthiness – is distinguished from “credibility” – their perceived epistemic standing. This structure allows for a “mismatch” between the two: someone may have rational authority but be denied credibility, or vice versa (Fricker, 1998, pp.167-168). Such mismatches occur because credibility is a “socially manifested” norm; “indicator-properties” relating to oppressed statuses (e.g., gender, sexuality, race) result in prejudiced epistemic discrimination (Fricker, 1998, pp.168-175).

Especially pertinent to cultural heritage is hermeneutic injustice: “having some significant area of one’s social experience obscured from collective understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice” (Fricker, 2007, p.155). Hermeneutically marginalised individuals are systemically and unfairly deprived of the resources required to epistemically participate in social contexts, “indicating subordination and exclusion from some practice that would have value” (Fricker, 2007, p.153). The unjust and harmful nature of epistemic injustice gives Fricker’s theses moral force.

Combining these insights, epistemically marginalised people(s) may be wrongfully denied epistemic credibility during cultural heritage processes. Pantazatos (2017) explores this, noting that “communities with more social and epistemic power tend to marginalise… in the interpretation of heritage” (p.370). As “areas of epistemic interaction”, heritage practices might exclude people(s) from the “economy of knowledge”, silencing an “alternative consideration for the future of heritage” (Pantazatos, 2017, pp.371-377). Indeed, Fricker’s insight that the victim of hermeneutic injustice “may be deprived from becoming who they are” is highly relevant; the fact that heritage discourses “give meaning to identity” and raise “questions about our self-understanding” renders them vulnerable to the “identity-constructive power” of hermeneutic injustice (Smith, 2010, p.63; Pantazatos, 2017, pp.373-374; Fricker, 2007, p.167).

Section 2 – The Failures: Eurocentric Historiography & Cultural Heritage

This section claims that a Eurocentric historiography, originating from imperialism, produces epistemic injustice in contemporary cultural heritage processes.

The era of the European cultural archive originated in the 19th century: coinciding with linear Darwinian understandings of progressive temporality, early museums were “influenced by the ideals of social improvement” and were “almost entirely chronological” (Panourgias, 2003). Thus began the construction of a European “theory of historical development” as a “unified progression” (Hardt, 2001, p.244). It constructs a dominant temporality of a “single homogenous and secular historical time” (Chakrabarty, 2000, p.15). This Eurocentric “genealogy… turns history into a moral success story” – an “evolutionist anthropology” of the “‘civilised’ West as the pinnacle of universal human progress” (Wolf, 1982, pp.44-46; Bunzl, Fabian, 1983/2014, p.ix-x). History becomes a “march across the world” (Hardt, 2001, p.243). Despite originating centuries ago, residual impacts remain significant: in academic history, “Europe remains the sovereign” with non-Western historians feeling obligated to “refer to works in European history” (Chakrabarty, 2000, p.28). In contrast, Western historians, social scientists, and anthropologists often produce ‘universal’ theories of human existence with “relative, and sometimes absolute, ignorance of the majority of humankind” (Chakrabarty, 2000, p.29).

Here, Chakrabarty addresses the standing of the ‘other’ against the unilinear Eurocentric historiography. Indeed, being deeply intertwined with colonial rule, the colonial historiography features the “explicit notion of the temporal difference between Europe and its territories” (Hardt, 2001, p.244). Non-European histories are “only conceivable insofar as they are positioned within or with respect to the history of Europe” (Hardt, 2001, p.243). Hence, the unilinear Eurocentric historiography has mediating and differentiating force, producing “temporal distance” between the West and the ‘other’ (Bunzl, Fabian, 1983/2014, p.viii; Hardt, 2001, p.243). The moral sovereignty of Europe’s “real history” is contrasted against the “savage” of so-called ethnohistory (Bunzl, Fabian, 1983/2014, p.ix-x).

Marginalising non-European cultures outside this historiography “flattens” them to an anachronism – “outside history’s time” (Moulin, 2015; Agathangelou, 2016, p.928). The global diversity of cultures cannot be understood as coeval under this Eurocentric historiography: whilst Europe is a pioneer with the “privilege to reside in the new and now”, the ‘other’ is merely “catching up” (Hardt, 2001, p.244; Kumarakulasingam, 2016, p.756; Moulin, 2015). At best, they are “conceived as moments, repetitions, or permutations” of European civilisation (Hardt, 2001, p.243). Inverse to the normative depiction of Europe’s advancement as virtuous, anachronistic cultures are subordinate “relic[s] of another time” (Chakrabarty, 2000, p.238).

This subordination has epistemic consequences. Eurocentric historiographies “compel epistemically blind non-Europeans” to understand themselves as “incomplete transitions” that can “never appear as immediate partners in a cultural exchange” (Kumarakulasingam, 2016, p.756; Bunzl, Fabian, 1983/2014, p.viii). The ‘other’ is consigned to a “lower level in the hierarchy of memories” (Danylevich, 2016, p.2). To briefly exemplify, the dominant North American historiography begins with Columbus as the “bearer of development” (Douglas, 2017), taming indigenous peoples “living… outside the boundaries of modernity” (Lovell, 2019, p.91) – “the introduction of Europeans onto the American continent [understood] as a continual process of improvement” (Douglas, 2017). Consequently, indigenous American people(s) are treated as “objects” of inquiry rather than epistemic “co‑creators” (Tsosie, 2012, p.1147):

Hermeneutic injustice… occurs with many Native American claims to protect aspects of their cultural identity from [unrecognised] harms. (Tsosie, 2012, p.1158)

My research suggests that the unilinear Eurocentric historiography causes epistemic injustice in cultural heritage processes. Certainly, Europe was “the global birthplace of the modern conservation movement” (Winter, 2012, p.1), with Authorised Heritage Discourse being dominated by institutions such as UNESCO (Smith, 2010, p.64). UNESCO’s 1972 World Heritage Convention attempted to produce “universal values of heritage” (Smith, 2010, p.64); however, it “did not actually represent the whole world, but rather adhered to a predominantly Western ethos” that “obscure[d] local and specific sub‑national expressions of heritage” (Alivizatou, 2011, p.38; Smith, 2010, p.64). In other words, UNESCO’s definition of ‘outstanding’ mistakenly attempts to understand “the entire spectrum of human culture” through Eurocentric notions of “true universality” (Cleere, 1996, p.228).

Quantitative studies support these claims. Reyes evidenced how “the colonial past continues to influence present… validations of cultural wealth” (2014, p.46). Nominations to the World Heritage List “tend to provide linear, evolutionist presentations of site histories”, focusing on the so-called “great men of history” (Reyes, 2014, p.47). Italy and Spain, despite representing <1.5% of the global population, comprise 9% of ‘outstanding’ sites (Reyes, 2014, p.60), reflecting a notable bias towards Greco-Roman architectural aesthetics (Cleere, 1996, pp.229-230). The fact that colonial history remains a “significant predicator for nominations” to the World Heritage List also furthers epistemic injustice through internalisation: non-European cultures internalise ‘universal’ cultural aesthetics, “excluding their own reputations” of heritage (Reyes, 2014, p.53). Therefore, as I illustrate in Figure 1, a vicious cycle of marginalisation is propagated.

In summary, non-European cultures have their heritage obscured from understanding in global authorised heritage institutions, owing to structural identity prejudices that originate from a unilinear Western historiography. Therefore, hermeneutic injustice occurs in heritage.

Section 3 – The Remedy: universality, alterity, or pluralism?

Having diagnosed these injustices, I evaluate possible solutions. Optimism may arise from Kumarakulasingam’s observation that “colonial temporality was never completely successful in perverting the relationship of the colonised to their past” (2016, p.756). I present three possible remedies: universality, alterity, and pluralism. Whilst the former strategies are both problematic, a middle-ground of pluralism is promising.

The universality strategy views the distinctness of European/Non-European histories as the core problem. Indeed, Europe’s “differentiating” historiography is what constructs the ‘other’ (Hardt, 2001, p.243). Perhaps, a pan-human approach to cultural heritage “would allow a genuinely coeval” cultural anthropology (Bunzl, Fabian, 1983, p.xi-xii). Furthermore, a universalist methodology of heritage produces compatibility between UNESCO and universal human rights declarations, namely those developed elsewhere in the UN (UDHR, 1949).

A second strategy – alterity – critiques this universalist approach. Recall that “the politics of universal time shaped and underwrote colonial domination” (Kumarakulasingam, 2016, p.755; my emphasis). To be “more sensitive and responsive to cultural context” requires a focus on “authenticity” rather than universal values (Winter, 2012, p.3). Affirming “alternative histories and narratives” prevents the hegemonizing linearity of Authorised Heritage Discourse as we know it (Agathangelou, 2016, pp.935-936; Smith, 2010, p.64). Thus, an ‘alterity’ methodology of heritage emphasises distinctive cultures without the overarching norms of Eurocentrism. This is promising; however, if taken to extremity, risks a parochial, segregating historiography. Global history has not featured “closed systems”: through intercultural “contact and influence” (Wolf, 1982, p.47), civilisations have actively developed and often hybridised, particularly since globalisation.

Figure 2: The Physical Self (1991)

Both universality and alterity strategies have their merits and flaws. Thus, I claim a pluralist middle-ground is the remedy. Pluralist anthropologies signify an ethics of “equality and difference” (Benhabib, 2003, p.195; my emphasis): although we are diverse, heritage practice must be underpinned by a common respect for human cultural histories as “open systems” (Wolf, 1982, p.47). Vitally, pluralism strives for accessible communication. Just as Fricker advocated “inclusive hermeneutics” through “reflexively aware” discourse, a “dialectical anthropology” endorses “social praxis” (Fricker, 2007, pp.169-171; Bunzl, Fabian, 1983/2014, p.xii). Pluralism, as an “epistemological alternative”, engages “active partners” in intersubjective heritage processes (Bunzl, Fabian, 1983/2014, p.xii). Open-mindedness is crucial: communication is “open to criticism and self-reflection”, even regarding fundamentals such as “the very meaning and nature of heritage” itself (Waterman & Smith, 2006, p.351).

To exemplify, consider thematic exhibitions. Disregarding “traditional chronological arrangement”, artefacts are curated thematically (Nairne, 1994, p.19). For instance, Greenaway’s The Physical Self (figure 2) curated diverse artefacts from throughout history, united by human physicality. This “cultural democratisation” breaks down “traditional barriers of classification” and the social hierarchies it implies (Panourgias, 2003).

[Thematic] affinities cut across chronological boundaries as well as conventional stylistic categories.

(Nairne, 1994, p.10)

Further, thematic exhibitions exemplify pluralistic curatorship through open dialogue. Revealing the “stagnation in curatorial experimentation”, they “initiate interaction with as many and as diverse members of society as possible” (Panourgias, 2003). In contemporary practice, “thematic relationships across the curation spaces [allow] local knowledge and perspectives [to] enrich curation efforts” (Sabharwal, 2021, p.684).

Conclusion

Although European hard-imperialism of previous centuries has largely ceased, Fanon’s insight that colonialism “turns its attention to the past of the colonised people, and distorts it, disfigures and destroys it” (Fanon, 1961/2004, p.149) remains relevant today.

This essay’s findings suggest that quasi-colonial historiographies persist in contemporary cultural heritage processes. The unilinear European temporality constructs itself as the pioneer, subordinating non‑Europeans to undeveloped anachronism. Consequently, epistemic injustice occurs, preventing inclusive participation in the socio‑epistemic processes of heritage, particularly in institutions such as UNESCO.

The solution lies at the middle-ground of universality and alterity. Pluralistic cultural heritage affirms both commonality and diversity, without succumbing to Eurocentric traditions. Exemplified through the thematic exhibitions, pluralistic heritage practice deconstructs the injustices of Western chronology and implies social praxis through curatorship.

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Footnotes

[1] Material artefacts are just one expression of heritage. Although this essay discusses tangible cultural heritage artefacts, injustices also relate to “intangible cultural heritage” e.g., “oral traditions, ceremonies, and practices” (Alivizatou, 2011, pp.38-39); also see Winter (2013, p.3).