Poverty & Duty: a Kantian rework of Pogge

Introduction

This essay claims that global poverty reflects a violation of both positive and negative duties on behalf of the affluent. In World Poverty and Human Rights (2002; henceforth WPHR), Pogge contends that the affluent’s duties of justice are only negative. Assuming the thoroughness of his empirical research, Section 1 agrees that the affluent ought to cease their ongoing contribution to global poverty and their consequent rights violations.

This essay discusses whether, if his account of negative duties is accepted, Pogge is also correct in claiming that the affluent do not possess positive duties of justice. I conclude not. Positive duties, although less weighty than negative, represent a congruous addition to Pogge’s account.

Section 2 introduces positive duties, showing that utilitarian theories (Singer, 1972) are inconsistent with Pogge. Therefore, I turn to Kantianism (Reglitz, 2019; Varden, 2006, 2008, 2011; Gilabert, 2004) to produce a partial critique, claiming that Pogge’s theory can and should be expanded:

3a) Pogge’s approach is fundamentally congruent with Kantianism;

3b) Kantianism’s deontological solidarity implies positive duties regarding poverty;

3c) Kantian positive duties apply globally.

Section 1: Pogge on Negative Duties

Negative duties demand that others cannot be unduly harmed or wronged (WPHR p.130). Assuming that everyone possesses inviolable rights, agents have corresponding negative duties to respect these rights, refraining from possible acts (Narveson, 2006, §2.2)

Negative rights approaches are typical of libertarianism, since “the presumption of individual liberty goes hand in hand with that of non-intervention” (Preble, 2016, p.167) – from the state, other individuals, or perhaps even natural phenomena. Hence, libertarians advocate minimal states, especially outside of domestic boundaries, sceptical of “government actions that depart from a narrow and well-defined mandate” to settle international disputes and sanction against active rights violations (ibid., pp.167-168). Libertarians typically maintain that foreign aid forcibly provided (i.e., through taxation) to the global poor violates the property rights of those funding it (ibid.). This conception of justice features minimal protections of “everyone’s right to a fair share of the natural resources in the world” (Varden, 2011, p.281); redistributive seizures of property are unacceptable, irrespective of factors such as poverty.

Pogge’s approach is akin to libertarianism in its negative rights based approach (WPHR, p.13). However, demonstrating that the affluent actively harm the global poor (violating their rights) allows him to advocate stringent anti‑poverty reforms far beyond conventional libertarianism. By engaging with a “coercive institutional order that avoidably leaves human rights unfulfilled without making reasonable efforts to aid its victims” (ibid., p.170), the affluent do not merely fail to counteract poverty – they actively cause it. “Poverty is an ongoing harm we inflict upon the global poor” (Pogge, 2005, p.1) through imbalanced international institutions, the active anti-addressing of residual impacts from violent historical oppression, and dominating the world’s resources (Fleisch, 2003, p.456). Concisely, Pogge claims that universal rights are violated by the affluent’s “causal production of global poverty” (Gilabert, 2004, p.541). Prevention of such harms requires radically reforming the Global Economic Order (GEO) (Pogge, 2005, p.4).

Evaluating the empirical veracity of Pogge’s account is beyond this essay’s scope: granting that the GEO actively causes global poverty, this negative duty approach is compelling. Rights-based approaches predominantly claim that negative rights are more weighty than positive (WPHR, pp.133, 201; Narveson, 2006, §2.2; Rawls, 1972, pp.114); hence why Pogge’s negative duty approach is primary in my discussion. The following sections evaluate Pogge’s claim that there are no positive duties of justice to counteract poverty.

Section 2: Positive Duties

Positive duties demand the helping or assistance of others, obliging duty-bearers to actively perform deeds (Breakey, 2015, pp.1198); Pogge includes both the duty to assist and the duty to shield others from harm in his definition (WPHR, p.130). While negative duty approaches centralise “self-ownership and freedom” in their account of justice, positive duty approaches seek to uphold some minimal standard of equality of goods such as “primary goods, capability, welfare” (Varden, 2011, p.282).

To briefly outline a notable proponent of the positive duty approach, as contrast to Pogge, note Singer. His utilitarianism claimed that if we have the capacity to assist others “without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance” to the hardship we can prevent, then we ought to do so (1972, p.231). A thought experiment, the analogy of the pond, has the reader suppose that a child is drowning before a potential rescuer, and can be saved at the expense of the rescuer muddying their clothes (ibid.) – our intuitions tell us to save the child. If disanalogies (e.g., the rescuers’ physical proximity, the rescuers’ epistemic certainty of successful assistance) cannot demonstrate an impactful moral contrast between pond and global poverty, Singer presents a reasonably compelling hypothesis.

However, as previously outlined, Pogge rejects Singer’s approach. While this essay likewise does not adopt Singer’s utilitarianism, I disagree with Pogge’s reason for doing so: Pogge rejects the claim that "there is [any] positive duty of justice to eradicate severe global poverty” (WPHR, p.12). Gilabert clarifies that Pogge does not deny the existence of positive duties altogether – rather, he “disassociates duties of justice and duties related to human rights (i.e., duties of global justice) from general positive duties of aid to those in need… ‘human rights only entail negative duties’ (WPHR, p.66)” (Gilabert, 2004, p.543). Pogge’s concludes that positive duties, characterised as “beneficence” (WPHR, p.134), become supererogatory and non-binding.

My approach is concordant with Gilabert’s goal of “modifying and complementing” Pogge’s theory (Gilabert, 2004, p.543); negative duties remain an essential aspect, with positive duties as a consistent expansion of his fundamentals. Singer’s utilitarian model of positive duties, although fairly persuasive, is incompatible with Pogge’s rights-centric deontology. Thus, the next section turns to deontology to produce a model of positive duties.

Section 3a: Pogge and Kantianism

Pogge’s theory exhibits many Kantian themes. After identifying these themes (3a), I claim that a Kantian framework featuring positive duties of justice is a compelling addition that remedies Pogge’s oversights (3b/3c).

To begin with, Pogge himself believes that the Kantian justification of perfect duties overseen by “coercive legal institutions” (WPHR, p.135) is plausible. Individuals’ fundamental entitlement to freedom requires that some civil order exists to fairly protect their freedoms; this maxim is vital to both Kant and Pogge’s theories. Further, the Lockean Proviso, reconstructed by Pogge, can be expressed in Kantian terms. The proviso maintains the universal negative duty to abstain from over-appropriations of natural resources that violate others’ freedom to access such resources (Locke, 1798, §27 & §33); this parallels the Kantian Universal Principle of Right. Reglitz emphasises Kant’s maxim that while the property rights we hold over our own bodies are steadfast, “claims to possessing anything beyond our bodies are much more contentious” (Reglitz, 2019, pp.491-492). It is this contention that demands the role of some civil condition to oversee the protection of liberties – a ‘hinderance of the hinderance of freedoms’ (ibid.). Pogge’s claim that “taking, while leaving enough and as good for others, is compatible with their freedom to do the same” (WPHR, p.137) echoes this Kantianism.

Therefore, existing Kantian themes begin my justification of Kantian positive duties as an extension of Pogge’s theory: these duties are founded on deontological solidarity (3b) and cosmopolitanism (3c).

Section 3b: Deontological Solidarity

Gilabert dissects solidarity into “a) beneficence; b) reasonable assistance in securing conditions of autonomous agency; and c) harm avoidance” (Gilabert, 2005, p.548). Pogge dismisses (a) as supererogatory positive duties, while accepting the negative rights implied by (c). In doing so, he overlooks (b).

This oversight would need not concern Pogge if (b) was not central to Kantian deontology. However, this is not the case. Kant’s second formulation emphasises the intrinsic value of all humans and the importance of their rational autonomy (Kant, 2017/1785, p.29). This formulation affirms (b) in addition to (c). Legitimate Kantian civil orders, as a minimal condition, must ensure that “no person can be denied through law the right to become an active citizen” (Varden, 2006, pp.272-273). The weaker interpretation of this condition requires that laws cannot “explicitly and legally” deny active citizenship (ibid.); i.e., a negative duty. However, Varden believes a stronger interpretation is more consistent with Kant’s “most fundamental assumption” (ibid.), the universal right to liberty. This interpretation holds that civil institutions have positive duties to ensure “the totality of legislation is such that all persons actually can work themselves into an active condition” (ibid.). Varden’s conclusions imply that economic justice, social mobility, and accessible active citizenship are central to legitimate Kantian civil institutions. Poverty, as the antithesis of these ideals, cannot be accepted under Kantian deontology.

Further, it is crucial to note that solidarity demands that duties, namely to assist in securing conditions of autonomous agency, do not apply to a select few. Critics may claim that only the ultra-wealthy have such a duty, while the moderately affluent do not.[1] These critics are mistaken under Kantianism, due to the principle of “fairness of duty allocation” (Breakey, 2014, p.1204). Unfair allocations of duties are inherently non-Kantian for two reasons: i) they violate the rights of the rights of the ultra-wealthy to not be used as the “mere means to produce the resources required by others” (ibid.); and ii) they overlook the essential fact that rights regimes must distribute duties, positive or negative, in a fair and universal way. Every duty-bearer welcomes their own universal rights, and therefore must accept that duties are held universally – this entails that moderately affluent people have positive duties. Defining the details of “fair allocation” is complex (ibid.); however, we can conclude that universal solidarity implies that the affluent hold some positive duties to counteract poverty. Therefore, Pogge’s oversight of solidarity (b) is detrimental to his assertion that there are no positive duties of justice.

Section 3c: Cosmopolitanism

Throughout Section 3b, I referred to ‘civil institutions’. This section establishes that Kantian deontology favours a cosmopolitan civil order to regulate rights and duties, facilitating relevance to global poverty. Moral cosmopolitanism claims that “all persons stand in certain moral relations to one another” (WPHR, p.169). In contrast, nationalism allow states, as primary regulators of justice, to prioritise compatriots (Shue, 1981, p.132).

Kant himself was sceptical of a global civil condition, concerned that divided authority would cause irresolvable impasses and threaten state sovereignty. Pogge’s exposition of the efficiency of federalism since Kant’s writing addresses the former concern (WPHR, p.178). Reglitz addresses the latter: Kant’s insistence on untouchable state sovereignty relies on the claim that states are best equipped to fulfil their tasks (Reglitz, 2019, p.494) – namely, the coercive protection of liberties. Since Pogge’s research evidences the contrary, I believe Kant’s initial concerns have been addressed.

Furthermore, Gilabert demonstrates that, contrary to Pogge’s claim, positive duties may arise without any pre-existing relationship to rights-bearers. Consider an uncontroversial case: a Kantian model would certainly maintain that positive duties exist to assist cognitively disabled citizens through support services funded by taxation (Gilabert, 2004, p.545). “Choice-sensitive” deontology demands that, as a matter of justice, civil institutions ought to protect the liberties of disabled citizens through active assistance. Accepting such a conception of strong positive duties at local and domestic levels, there seems to be no deontological justification to reject global positive duties (Gilabert, 2004, p.546). Reglitz’s cosmopolitanism concurs that Kantian justice demands duties to create “coercive political institutions that span the entire globe” (2019, p.490). Kantians must frame property rights, those crucial to our examination of freedom and poverty, in a global way, since owning things not only excludes compatriots from accessing resources – it excludes everyone everywhere (2019, p.501). No state has a legitimate “privileged claim” to resources over another (ibid.), especially when global resources inequality violates the freedoms of billions. Since moral universalism is vital to Kantianism, violating foreigner’s rights cannot be accepted. Moral cosmopolitanism necessitates legal cosmopolitanism (Reglitz, 2019, p.497; Pogge, 2002, p.169); hence, a global civil order is required to oversee rights-protections and duties. This conclusion is affirmed by Kant himself: despite being sceptical of cosmopolitanism, he declared that “any rights of nations, [including property rights], are merely provisional. Only in a universal association of states can rights come to hold conclusively and a true condition of peace come about” (Kant, 1996/1797, p.350).

Conclusion

In conclusion, this essay claims that global poverty reflects a violation of both positive and negative duties on behalf of the affluent. Taking Pogge’s account of negative duties as a starting point (Section 1), this essay rejects his view that there are no positive duties of justice. After introducing positive duties (Section 2), Section 3a identified how Pogge’s approach is fundamentally congruent with Kantianism. Section 3b highlighted how the solidarity of Kantian deontology implies positive duties of justice, including the positive duty to assist in securing conditions of autonomous agency – i.e., actively remedy poverty. Section 3b emphasised that such duties are universal; therefore, we require a cosmopolitan civil order (i.e., some supra-national rights regime) to oversee the duties described in 3b.

Bibliography

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Extra Reading

Brady, D., Blome, A., and Kleider, H. (2016). How Politics and Institutions Shape Poverty and Inequality in Brady, D., & Burton, L. (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of the Social Science of Poverty. Oxford University Press.

Daskal, S. (2013). Confining Pogge’s Analysis of Global Poverty to Genuinely Negative Duties. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 16(2), 369–391. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-012-9349-4

Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2017). Pogge, poverty, and war. Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 16(4), 446–469. https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X17701388

Share The World’s Resources (2020). A Primer on Global Economic Sharing [Online]. [Accessed 3 January 2021]. Available at: https://www.sharing.org/sites/default/files/images/PDFs/A%20primer%20on%20global%20economic%20sharing%2C%20STWR%2C%20June%202014.pdf

World Trade Organisation (2020). The Role of Trade in Ending Poverty [Online]. [Accessed 4 January 2021]. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/trade/publication/the-role-of-trade-in-ending-poverty

Notes

[1] The real-world prevalence of this critique is reflected in Collins et al’s report (2016).