Populism and the Moralisation of Politics

The American Heritage Dictionary defines populism as “a political philosophy supporting the rights and power of the people in their struggle against the privileged elite”[1]. Although this definition identifies the importance of populism as the ‘people’s ideology’, it overlooks the fact that modern populism no longer presents ‘the privileged elite’ as the enemy; a prima facie empirical study of populism in Eastern Europe shows that the perceived enemy is the “masses arriving from other civilizations”[2]. Thus, I will split my definition into two sections: necessary conditions (i.e. populism cannot be such without these factor(s)), and sufficient conditions (i.e. common, notable features of populism). The impacts and potential success of populism as a political concept are too broad to be covered comprehensively – I will hence focus on two themes: the moral discussion surrounding populism, and the compatibility (or lack of) with various understandings of democracy.

I have asserted that populism is a ‘political concept’ – semantic philosophy provides an appropriate starting point to consider the properties of a concept. Concepts are not merely empirically prescribed to phenomena: they are created mental faculties[3]. I consider political orators to be the forces that articulate these faculties within politics – populism is thus a concept that refers to a specific means of expressing political concepts.

Needless to say, populism exists on both ends of the political spectrum in very different forms (Hugo Chavez and Viktor Orban would hardly be seen in coalition), bringing me to the conclusion populism is, above all, a method. That said, I’ll soon discuss how some underlying ideological implicatures can be extracted from most populist methods. Zeitgeists are not formed by politicians, they are simply the articulated interests of the electorate (usually expressed by demagogues). An important point must be made here: specific policy ideas are more likely to come from politicians (namely analysts and special advisors) who have their ‘finger on the pulse’ in order to claim and electorally salient policy (especially within UK politics in which Labour and Conservatives have often fought to claim the centre). However, specific policy requests rely on an underlying attitude amongst citizens: politicians are, on balance, reactionary to their voters, rather than vice versa.

The Overton Window is mapped by policy makers, but fundamentally the terrain is that of public zeitgeist. I propose that populism simply refers to a certain way of mapping the political terrain: populism is a toolkit that specialises in mapping a certain mood through codification of suppressed interest.

Laclau[4] notices that populism thrives when isolated demands transition into popular subjectivity. Alienation is the central aspect of a causative definition of populism. More extreme than simply being alienated from government (e.g. as a competitive opposition party) is the feeling of alienation from the arena of political discussion altogether. Hence, demagogues play a paramount role in coercing this fundamental and influential aspect of the human condition: the rousing transition from alienation to collective force. This is the necessary condition of defining populism.

Other common notable themes within populism also develop this definition as sufficient conditions, namely, ‘us versus them’. The broader structure of ‘us versus them’ follows cleavage theory, which paints an accurate model of both cultural divides, but also socio-economic divides[5]. Both pronouns are teeming with connotations within populist rhetoric. The ‘us’ tends to represent a community that was once-great, but now muzzled and thus abused to the status of underdog. All of these carry with them a powerful sense of injustice, as if something rightfully theirs has been unjustly stripped away. In contrast, ‘them’ refers to an illegitimate threat, seeking to oppress our ‘political protagonist’ through suppression and impurity. And just as in myth and Shakespearean tales of heroism, the vision proposed is that rightful power will surely return to the original power. Debate aside on the impact of populism, it can’t be denied the methods are ingenious – populist rhetoric takes previously untapped, alienated peoples, and unites them by giving them exactly what they want: a sense of political belonging and justice, resulting in significant and often rapid political support.

Regarding the impact of populism, my first theme will consider the moral impact of populism. The most significant scholar in this debate is Chantal Mouffe[6] – her argument follows that the “antagonistic dimension” of politics is necessary, and that the rejection of such leads to a dangerous ‘moralisation’ of political debate. For Mouffe, if political ideologies are viewed as moral stances, this opens the door to an Overton Window that is too accepting and open to extremist stances.

Mouffe’s critique is more centred on the point that moralisation of politics results in an all-inclusive relativistic approach. It is imperative to note that this non-adversarial politics would only occur in a society of moral relativism where every moral theory is as relevant/irrelevant as the next. In contrast, a society with an agreed, objective ethical foundations would have little issue resolving such debates. That said, Mouffe rightly points out there is no current objective moral code which we all agree upon – different secular and religious object over matters of right and wrong. So, in practice, we do somewhat live in a morally relative world at present, with no moral consensus. It can hence be examined if this somewhat ethically relative and moralised political framework is viable.

What Mouffe implies towards in her work is Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) – Graham et al argue that political debates today should be fought in the arena of morality, based on deep-rooted intuitions rather than specific reasons[7]. Although the thought of opening the proverbial ‘back door’ to extreme political views through populist principles, namely MFT, it must be evaluated if this is a legitimate progression.

Graham notices that most debates in modern politics centre around moral debates, “culture-war issues”: e.g. gay marriage and abortion. This ‘broadening of the moral terrain’[8] presents politics as a manifestation of debates between ethical principles. Graham’s argument is persuasive in its teleological approach from purpose – he questions what purpose ethics would serve if not for the protection of individuals, families and nations i.e. political rights. This functionalist understanding of ethics as a social framework is not uncommon – ethics is often seen as simply the means to the ends of making social life possible[9]. The implications of Moral Foundations Theory of Mouffe’s argument are striking: rather than acting as a hinderance to the somewhat regulatory antagonisms within politics, the ethicised debates can be seen as a ‘purer’, reduced version of the issue at the heart of the matters. For instance, instead of (1) an aggressive partisan argument between UK centrists and radical populist Nigel Farage, the debate on immigration would be (2) ‘concentrated’ to more fundamental ethical principles: in this example, human rights, autonomy, definitions of community etcetera. In my view, there is no fundamental issue in this vision of a purely ethicised political arena.

Mouffe shrewdly notes the issue is that these two visions of moral and political debate are becoming confused. Debate (2) is an intellectual utopia in which discussion was well-mannered and yet accessible to the general electorate. There would (hypothetically) be no issue with (2); Mouffe has no objection to this unfeasible state. Instead, Mouffe rightly objects to the current muddy blend of moral lexicon and skilled demagogues who can manipulate ethical principles into evocative sound-clips through the populist method. Herein lies the danger.

Thus, to avoid the dangers of a muddy politico-ethical hybrid, politics must somehow evade ethical influence – but, to avoid circularity, the supporting arguments for this evasion cannot be ethical. Arguments from political ideology must therefore be temporarily suspended. Instead, I present an argument from a more fundamental definition of politics. Politics is the process of organising power based on communal groups; politics must be a group process. To clarify, although anarchy and individualism for instance are both valid political ideologies focused on individual rights, they are nonetheless shared ideologies. And although totalitarianism can be understood politically, I consider such systems anti-political because they undermine the ability to congregate and form political ideology i.e. the political process has died. In this definition of politics, the aggregation of people based on ideology is imperative. I argue that the moralisation of politics created by populism undermines this process of ideological aggregation.

Although I defined the populist method centrally around principles of forming ideological communities (‘us’ versus ‘them’), my argument is that by moralising politics, populism actually promotes individualistic ideologies. Regarding political self-identification, most citizens can both (a) identify their individual views i.e. have political intuitions on what they support and also (b) categorise themselves into ideological communities by broadly identifying with political camps (namely the left or right, liberal or conservative). On the other hand, it usually follows that ethical self-identification is more complex: people can easily perform (a) – identify their individual ethical intuitions i.e. ‘moral compass’. However, most people aren’t educated in the niche field that is ethical theory; e.g. most people can say that they support the greatest good for the greatest number, but they aren’t able to identify themselves into the ethical category that is Bentham’s Utilitarianism. It’s this aggregation of ideas/ideology which is the stuff of democracy – without like minded groups there can be no political process. An ethical view of politics undermines the role of politics as an arena for collective ideology, for ethical camps are far less distinct and more individualistic than political ideologies such as liberal or conservative.

This brings us to the next issue regarding the impact of populism: the compatibility (or lack of) with democratic principles. For the purposes of this essay, I will refer to western democratic principles. To begin with, pluralism is a development of the fundamental democratic principle of freedom of speech and representation: contrary to elitism, all groups can coexist and be heard, working as an aggregate of co-operate minorities rather than a hegemonic majority[10]. Imperative is a democratic equity – all groups deserve equal opportunity to contribute, but ultimately, a consensus of common interest can be achieved. These tolerant heterogenous principles of populism are in stark contrast to the populist method, which by its nature must create a homogeneous unity[11] and a cleavage between groups.

That said, Mouffe[12] considers Schmitt’s definition of democracy in which there is a clearly defined structure between the rulers and the ruled; this would seem to support populism as a democratic structure, for what other system so prolifically defines the demos? However, Mouffe rightly points out that this process of defining the structure of the demos within a populist method seldom fails to undermine another paramount pillar of western democracy – human rights. The alienation of the ‘other’ segregates peoples and, more often than not, challenges human citizenship rights. Here we see another way in which populism fails to partner smoothly with understandings of democracy.

The issues of populism and democracy regarding majority view is also vital. At their core, both seek to fairly represent the people: Stavrakakis describes populism as “a radical democratic perspective, with the widening of popular participation in decision-making”[13]. But yet again, the issue is not as simple in practice as principle. Simply having a majority rule doesn’t necessarily result from a democratically autonomous electorate; suppose a form of political mob mentality, in which “the citizen ceases to operate autonomously and seeks the certainty of mass”[14]. Although this critique of populism is highly pertinent within successful populist majority parties, I consider another notion for minority populist movements. The effective and opportunistic minority can be just as influential as the majority: UKIP were far from a majority – even at the peak of their power, only 12.6% of the electorate voted for Farage’s populist principles. However, using the power of the populist method at a time ripe for such a movement, the party had an unrepresentatively large impact on the British political system; many leave voters had not even considered Brexit as a solution until Farage hailed it as the only one required. Democracy is thus not rule of the majority, but rather the best organised minority – the populist method bolsters this cynical view of democracy.

To conclude, I defined populism as a method, not an ideology: the necessary condition of a populist movement is the way in which it maps the political terrain, namely, through the transition from alienation to collective influence with rhetorical force. This definition is enhanced by examining the cleavage theory – the ‘us versus them’ mentality. Mouffe’s theory against populism from ethics is, in short, brilliant. Building on this, I consider the dangerous inability of ethical opinion to be coerced into groups to the same degree as political camps. Finally, I argue populism, despite posing as rule of majority that clearly defines the demos, populism encourages undemocratic practice; tyranny of minorities and the eroding of political equality.

Footnotes

[1] The American Heritage, Dictionary of the English Language, 5th Ed., Available at http://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=populism

[2] Orban, V., (2016), annual speech outside the Hungarian National Museum in Budapest, http://www.renegadetribune.com/hungarian-prime-minister-viktor-orban-time-come-opposition-resistance/

[3] Deleuze, G., Guattari, F., (1996), What is Philosophy?, New York, Columbia University Press, p.11

[4] Laclau, E., (2005), On Populist Reason, The People and The Discursive Production of Emptiness, Verso, London, New York, p.86

[5] Kriesi, H., (2015), Populism: Concepts and conditions for its rise in Europe”, Comunicazione Politica Vol. 2, pp.175-193

[6] Mouffe, C., (2000), Chapter 5, A Politics without adversary?, taken from The Democratic Paradox), p.129

Mouffe, C., (2005), The End of Politics, in: Panizza, F. (ed.) Populism and the mirror of democracy, London, Verso, pp.72-98

[7] Graham, J. et al, (2013), The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, p.16

[8] Graham, J., et al, (2011), Mapping the Moral Domain Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, American Psychological Association, Vol. 101, No. 2, p.367

[9] Haidt, J., Kesebir S., (2010), Morality, Handbook of Social Psychology, 5th Ed., Hoboken, NJ: Wiley; pp.797-832

[10] Flatham, R., (2005), Pluralism and Liberal Democracy

[11] Abts, K., Rummens, S., (2007), Populism versus Democracy, Political Studies: vol. 55, p.406

[12] Mouffe, (2000), Schmitt and the Paradox of Liberal Democracy, p.43

[13] Stavrakakis, Y., (2018), Populism, Anti-Populism and Democracy, Political Insight, Volume: 9 issue: 3, pp.33-35

[14] Mavrozacharakis, E., (2018), Populism and Democracy: An Ambiguous Relationship, European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities, 2018, Volume 7, Issue 4, Chapter 6. Conclusion: Democracy and Populism Are Two Incompatible Concepts