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Introduction
It is unsurprising that tensions arise in plural societies: in fact, divergent positionalites and values are prerequisite. This essay critically examines two of these contemporary tensions by evaluating the socio-ethical frameworks that underpin the various stances. Firstly, I outline the concept of pluralism and consider why and how it is relevant in childhood studies. Two forms of pluralism will be characterised: a) pluralism as a virtuous attitude; b) value pluralism. Stances within both tensions will, in part, be evaluated on the extent to which they promote pluralism in forms (a) and/or (b). Fundamentally, this involves asking, “what are the conditions for the functioning of a society that is plural in character?” (Sacks, Sutherland, 1996, p.47).
The first tension surrounds the proposal of a decolonial curriculum. Focusing on history curriculum, I begin with an exposition of the decolonial approach and explain how it promotes pluralism: its methods develop a pluralistic attitude in children (a), and its outcomes prevent marginalisation. Following this, I present the critiques of those who claim decolonial theory is anti-liberal in its overly-presentist approach. I claim that although there is an undeniable presentism, critical race theory skilfully justifies why interpreted pasts are so crucial to contemporary pluralism. On balance, the critiques are not weighty enough to counteract the substantial benefits in the interest of creating an inclusive pluralist environment for child development in schools.
The second tension examines state-funded faith schools. I will explain the support for both positions, for and against, analysing why each provides highly compelling points. I conclude that whereas the pro-faith school stance appeals to form (b) – value pluralism – to a greater extent, the anti-faith school stance appeals more so to form (a) of pluralism as virtue. Therefore, both stances can be legitimately held in plural societies.
The Pluralist Framework
Pluralism, broadly speaking, is a respect of diverse people and their attitudes, beliefs, and values, applying to a wide range of civic and social affairs. In judicial contexts, pluralist maxims may concern disparate views: views and testimony, ceteris paribus, should be treated equally, seeking just solutions that avoid shunning or bigoted suppression (Human Rights Act, 1998, §6). In economics, pluralism would likely value equality of opportunity, allowing people to reach their goals unimpeded by prejudice (Anderson, 1975, p.291). In democratic/developmental/social contexts, the pluralist encourages more than mutual ‘tolerance’, seeing distinctly positive impacts of diversity – the pluralist encourages open, respectful, and constructive discussion between diverse people, rather than an assimilationist model; consider the work of John Dewey for this expression of pluralism (Eisele, 1983, p.151). Twenty-first century policymakers in education studies are shedding previously essential tenets of modern statecraft, shifting towards institutional reforms driven by cultural pluralism (Fuller, 2003) – therefore, the use of this framework seems pertinent to my analysis.
Clearly, political pluralism is a nebulous concept – for the purposes of this essay, I put forward two formulations that frame the analysis of my tensions, explaining their meaning in the context of childhood studies:
a) Pluralism as a virtuous attitude.
The notion of the pluralistic attitude is outlined in the work of Roegholt et al (1998) and Salim (2013, pp.126-128). These researchers highlight the increasing presence of monistic curricula that naïvely root themselves in objectivism: “students who see things differently are silenced” (Roegholt et al, 1998, p.126). Developing children’s pluralistic attitude through education is the proposed solution to this concerning trend, emphasising students’ discursive virtues and open-mindedness. Roegholt et al deploy John Dewey’s core belief that knowledge reflects a man-made world, and that multiple knowledge forms can work collaboratively, united by their common circumstances and problems. This pedagogy encourages students to “examine all knowledge” and be mindful of what is implied by different knowledge forms (ibid. p.128). This formulation of pluralism understood as a pedagogically developed attitude, in my view, reflects a virtue ethical approach. Being pluralist becomes an aspect of moral character, alongside other moral traits such as generosity or empathy. The pluralistic attitude is a virtue that can be learnt, practiced, and habituated; this formulation is therefore highly intuitive, since it correlates the inherently developmental approach of virtue ethics with childhood studies, a field focused the developmental stage of human life.
b) Value Pluralism
Value pluralism is “an account of the structure of the normative universe” which demands that “qualitatively distinct values cannot be fully-rank ordered” (Galston, 1999, p.770). Isaiah Berlin, being perhaps the most notable of all pluralist political philosophers, emphasised that “respect between systems of values” produces liberal consequences, and hence belongs in liberal societies (Berlin, 1998, §8). In my view, value pluralism is highly compatible with a deontological approach: a key aspect of many deontological theories is a subject-centred, rights based approach. The value pluralist, utilising deontological maxims, says that all people have agent-neutral (i.e., free of prejudice) and inviolable rights that cannot be breached on consequentialist grounds (Larry & Moore, 2020, §2.2). This rights-based approach is therefore effective in its capacity to protect minority groups who, under consequentialism, may be harmed in the interest of some ‘greater-good’ outcome or net societal gain. In education, value pluralism may be expressed as the claim that children’s diverse values (perhaps cultural or religious) must be respected during schooling, since freedom of expression is a fundamental universal right (UDHR, 1948, §18).
This essay assumes the desirability of pluralism in both form (a) or (b), centralising them in my evaluation of tensions relating to children and their development in liberal societies.
Tension 1
Tension lies between those that support the proposal of a decolonial curriculum and those who oppose it. I support the proposal on the grounds that it develops a pluralistic attitude amongst children in schools, promoting pluralism (a).
The Decolonial Curriculum
This summer, over 250,000 people signed a petition calling for reforms to the UK curriculum that recognise Britain’s colonial past (UK Govt. Petitions, 2020). The format of the term ‘decolonial’ itself already begins to capture its goals: it is a deconstructive approach, seeking to critique and dismantle an existing system due to its flaws. The decolonialist examines the “global knowledge economy” (Mudaly, 2018, p.67), exposing residual injustices within our “colourblind” curriculum (Diamond, 2020) after centuries of imperialism. Research has found that innovative curriculum is an important part of academic achievement for all demographics (Borko et al, 2003; Reyes et al 1999) – in the absence of such innovations, schools, as formative arenas of knowledge production, have the dangerous capacity to instil single-approach attitudes in students that, unless actively disentangled in later life, will endure once embedded (Nabi, 2020).
For instance, the British Empire has been taken in and out of the curriculum over the last 30 years depending on the whim of each passing government (Lidher, 2019, p.1); but even when present, discourses within these curricula have marginalised racial/ethnic minority groups in many ways. Among their flaws, they eulogise British imperial greatness (Canandine et al, 2001), understate the contributions of racial/minority figures with only 11% of modules reference any black contribution to British history (The Guardian, 2020a; Nabi, 2020), and celebrate imperial “heroes” – to use former Education Secretary Gove’s phrasing. This all feeds into a condescending narrative of “civilisational infantilism” (Mehta, 1990, p.443; Watson, 2020, p.273) that protects Eurocentric power.
“[T]he ‘government should ensure history lessons are relevant to all young people in Britain’. The Black Curriculum recognises that Black history is British history.” (Stennett, 2020)
Developing this account further, consider the impact of ‘insider-outsider’ relations on pedagogic development. For Vygotsky, the individual embodies their social context, with each child having their own ‘zone of proximal development’: the difference between what a child can achieve independently versus what they could achieve with the support of adults (Sager, 2017, §1). Roegholt et al utilise this Vygotskian approach to highlight the importance of a child’s insider-outsider status as part of their development (1998, p.130). So, if evidence showed that racially inclusive curricula help nullify the detriments of being an ‘outsider’ during schooling, this would represent compelling support of the decolonial approach, since pluralist principles strongly oppose these detriments. The insights of Emily Folorunsho, head of history at Barking Abbey School, suggest that this evidence exists: “[f]or black students, learning black history creates a sense of belonging. It makes them feel seen. For white students, it eradicates that misconception that Britain belonged to white people and black people came here” (The Guardian, 2020).
Overall, decolonial curriculum reform is pluralist both in its methods and its outcomes. Its methods develop students’ pluralistic attitude (a), engaging them with a broader pedagogy that examines knowledge beyond the status quo of white Eurocentrism. Further, the above suggests that children are experiencing hardship in education, feelings of humiliation or being an ‘outsider’, due to their racial or ethnic background. In the absence of decolonial efforts, students will be severely marginalised – pluralism, in any form, opposes marginalisation of this kind. Thus, a decolonial curriculum belongs in a plural society.
Critique: Dangers of Presentism
The decolonial approach has attracted criticism on various grounds; herein lies the tension. The anti-presentist critique claims that the decolonial approach, in its attempt to promote certain liberties, dangerously infringes upon others: namely the freedom of children to think freely and objectively, unimpeded by unacceptable intrusions of socio-political agendas onto education.
The Black Educators Alliance’s pledge to build a 21st century dynamic education system which integrates issues social justice (B.E.A., 2020, §3 & §5).[1] Commentators, predominantly right wing, see this as highly problematic:
“History isn’t there for us to like or dislike; it just is. And yet some people are desperate to use it as a political tool.” (Robinson, 2020)
Implied here is meta-ethic that leans towards relativism, in which moral norms are a reflection of the society of the time. For instance, the relativist is more hesitant to condemn Gove’s ‘imperial heroes’ during history lessons, since slavery, at the time, was not understood to be wrong to the same extent it is today. Over time, societies’ dominant moral norms have shifted dramatically – it would therefore be “unfair” on the slave trader to apply contemporary woke (a term meaning being socially aware, particularly with reference to race) Western liberal moral standards (Roberts, 2018). In short, they claim that a substantial charitable awareness of historical context must shape the way we judge historical figures.
Herein lies, critics say, a crucial flaw of decolonial reforms. Indeed, there has been a growing ‘presentism’ within political discourse, especially in the last twenty years: allegedly, presentists have the unwise tendency to interpret the past using contemporary frameworks. This juridification of history has resulted in an increasing concern with the impact of the victims of ‘historical wounds’ (Fareld, 2019, p.59). Some historians have expressed concern with this growing presentism, since it “signifies concretely that the time of justice and the time of history no longer are separated” (Rousso, 2001, p.265); problematically, presentism consists in the dangerous self-congratulatory assumption that contemporary standards are intrinsically superior to past standards (Hunt, 2002; Fareld, 2019, p.62). In some form or another, the increasingly blurred boundaries between past and present represents a threat to fair historical understanding (Fareld, 2019, p.59).
In sum, critics claim that a decolonial education has no place in liberal societies due to its potential to form a quasi-authoritarian sentiment among children that there is a concretely right and wrong way to interpret history. Neo-liberal governments should encourage ‘Choice and Voice’ in students (Thompson, 2017), encouraging free speech over so-called political correctness (The Equiano Project, 2020).
Response: Critical Race Theory
In response to this critique, I turn to critical race theory. My reply somewhat embraces the presentist critique, maintaining the past is “constantly, urgently present as part of our everyday experience” – Torpey notes the growing prevalence of this discourse (2004, pp.240-41). In other words, the past is central to an ongoing present (Fareld, 2019, p.64) and therefore our history curriculum cannot fail to equip children with the skills insight to understand this.
Commentators such as Robinson are incorrect to claim that history curriculum “just is” – educating history is more nuanced than recalling events: curriculum not only shapes what is taught, but what is learnt and how this impacts individual and social change (Jansen, 2017, p.12). The past, or what remains of it, can be “selectively picked”, constructing narratives of who we are today (Catterall, 2017, p.631). Within diverse societies, there is often a dominant culture – one which has cultural, political, or social power over oppressed communities (Oxford Reference, 2020). Dominant cultures have disproportionate power over constructed narratives, selectively controlling what is remembered, and crucially, how it is remembered (Catterall, 2017, pp.631-632). Perhaps the advocate of the decolonial curriculum can contently ‘bite the bullet’ of those that critique its presentism, knowing that it promotes various greater goods of inclusive education and wellbeing for students through the deconstruction of harmful constructed narratives.
Achille Mbembe highlights the “perverse engagement in this ritual of self-humiliation and self-debasement” (2016, p.32) when oppressed communities are compelled to turn a blind eye to symbols of historical subjugation (e.g. a curriculum that fails to recognise the residual impact of racial injustices). Certainly, Mbembe would condemn the avoidable humiliation caused by outdated curricula.
Tension 1: Conclusion
The pluralist benefits of decolonial curricula outweigh the concerns. Mono-method Eurocentric curricula can and should be decolonialised to create an inclusive and pluralist education. There is an undeniable presentism within the decolonial approach: a heightened awareness of constructed pasts and contemporary justice. However, this need not be detrimental. Presentism is a double-edged phenomenon: its worst form, thoughtless temporal superiority, can be circumnavigated, “sharpening our critical time consciousness and clear-sightedness” (Fareld, 2019, pp.66-67). An ethics of history, encouraging transparently positioned historians and teachers, facilitates productive discussion that prevents uncritical presentism. After all, the pluralistic attitude helps students understand positionalities, examine all knowledge, and consider what sort of worldview is implied from various knowledge forms (Roegholt et al, 1998, pp.126-128).
Tension 2
My second tension surrounds the debate on state-funded faith schools. Faith schools must follow the national curriculum, but nonetheless have a notable religious aspect in both their autonomy over religious studies and also their consideration of a child’s faith during admissions (GOV.UK, 2020). Firstly, I provide a meta-theological framework of religious pluralism to underpin a pluralist treatment of religions in society. I will present claims both for and against state-funded faith schools, before concluding that both stances are legitimate in plural societies, since both appeal effectively to pluralism in some form.
A Framework of Religious Pluralism
Value pluralism, form (b), will be more prevalent than in Tension 1. Tension 1 related to equal respect for people – I interpreted this in terms of non-value based factors such as race, sex, and ethnicity. The truth of this doctrine of equal respect for people in the sense of these ‘natural lottery’ brute luck factors is apparent. In other words, it is not philosophically challenging to construct a framework that endorses complete equality between people due to their race or ethnicity: see Luck Egalitarianism (Arneson, 2013, §4), Rawlsian Justice (Rawls, 1971, pp.118-123).
On the contrary, constructing a philosophical framework that endorses intrinsic equality between diverse and ostensibly contradictory religious values is more complex: recall that value pluralism (b) is “an account of the structure of the normative universe” which demands that “qualitatively distinct values cannot be fully-rank ordered” (Galston, 1999, p.770). Contrast this to the brute luck factors that imply no intrinsic set of values: there are no intrinsic ideological contradictions between the notions of pale skin versus dark skin (since there are no normative judgements implied by varying levels of the biological pigment melanin) in sense that there are deep ideological disparities between Abrahamic monotheism versus Brahministic polytheism.[2]
In order to provide a framework of normative religious pluralism, I turn to John Hick. Hick understood the global range of faiths as multiple refractions of a single ultimate reality (Hick, 1997, pp.160-173): this pluralistic hypothesis maintains that each religious belief system is a “veridical hallucination” (Hick, 1989, p.273) containing partial insight. Terrestrial lenses result in a single source of divinity producing a diverse range of religious perspectives and practices (Hick, 2000, p.40): this explains the strong correlations between religious belief and cultural practice (Hick, 1993, p.138). The Hickian pluralist model explains how ostensibly contradictory and incompatible religious belief systems all may contain value – this model bolsters our intuitions that oppose the innate supremacy of one faith over the next. Religious pluralism, as a meta-theology, is the framework which I deploy to underpin pluralism between diverse religious groups in society.
Faith Schools: The Case in Support
The government’s pro-faith school reasoning can be summarised as follows:
“[faith] schools achieve higher academic standards, …foster a religious ethos and moral values, … acknowledge the importance of parental choice, and support religious pluralism and diversity.” (King, 2010, p.283)
Each of these nutshell points may be unpacked to produce thorough support. To begin, I present the rights-based argument, as accordant with value pluralism’s deontological respect for diverse people’s rights. The argument goes as follows:
P1) If people should have freedom of religion, then they should have the right to a religious education;
P2) People should have freedom of religion;
C) People should have the right to a religious education.
The argument’s structure is valid – therefore, its soundness depends on the truth of the premises. I deem Premise 2 to be irrefutable due to Article 14 of the UNCRC (1989) and the Hickian pluralist framework. Premise 1, equating freedom of religion to a right to a religious education, is more contentious. However, there does seem to be significant support. Article 18 of the UNCRC declares that states must support parents with the services needed to raise their children, while Article 29 maintains that the goals of education must include a respect for children’s various cultural values. Perhaps the most significant support for P1 in the UK national context comes from Article 2 of the Human Rights Act (1998): “the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions”.
In addition to these rights declarations, there is compelling theological research that suggests education is essential to religious practice. A general model for this can be found in Winia et al (2020); norms, instilled through education, “become a frame of reference in behaving to be in line with their religious beliefs” (p.4). Religious pedagogies have various dimensions: educative, eschatological, social supervisory, encouraging brotherhood, and transformative (ibid.). Further, to briefly exemplify through some major UK religions, consider the following. In Christianity, Evangelism, the process of spreading the word of the Bible through preaching, is a necessary aspect of religious practice for many denominations. Evangelists describe the importance of the “4/14 window”, with the “vision and hope to maximize [children’s] transformational impact while they are young, and to mobilize them for continuing impact for the rest of their lives” (Transform World, 2013, p.1). In Islam, it is believed that a crucial part of family responsibility includes the raising of moral and righteous beings, since the Prophet Mohammed said, “A man is the shepherd of his family and responsible for his flock” (Stacey, 2010). Since religious education appears to be a fundamental aspect of religious practice, P1, and in turn, the rights-based argument, seems persuasive. Liberalism’s pledge towards greater choice for parents implies that the state should work with faith schools to create a “diverse partnership” (DfES, 2001, pp.44-45) that allows a plurality of families to exercise their right to religious values (pluralism form b).
Next, it can be alleged that faith schools promote the discursive nature of pluralism. Pring considers the claim that neo-liberal education, being “at the heart of the development of a world of ideas”, should include a range of voices partaking in a “tradition of criticism”. Crucially, these diverse voices require “an initiation into the ideas and beliefs which have shaped those distinctive modes of religious thinking” (2004, pp.56-57). Faith schools nurture distinct voices, rather than risk secular amalgamation. Recall that pluralism rejects the strong assimilationist model, recognising the importance of diverse values.
Finally, consider the claim that the expansion of faith school is necessary in order to maintain equality of treatment between religious groups. The privileges given to Christian and Jewish schools should be consistent to other faith groups (Pring, 2004, p.53); indeed “the ethos of Christianity has been embedded within the school system for centuries” (King, 2010, p.281). It seems reasonable to suggest that the introduction of a more diverse range of faith schools from minority denominations is a necessary step towards i) a more plural society and ii) the prevention of inter-faith hostilities caused by unequal state support.
These two further claims, in addition to the rights-based argument, composes a strong case in support of faith schools.
Faith Schools: The Case in Opposition
On the other hand, there are compelling reasons to oppose faith schools. Firstly, to address the ‘inequality of treatment’ claim in support of more diverse faith schools, we must note that highlighting inequalities between faith schools does not itself support the creation of more. Rather, this logic can easily be reversed to advocate a decrease in Judeo-Christian faith school privilege (Judge, 2001, p.463).
Secondly, counter to the claim that a more balanced array of faith schools will reduce inter‑faith hostilities, some claim that faith schools are another means through which broader religious inequalities can be harmfully manifested. The Ouseley Report (2002) suggested that faith schools in Bradford only encouraged division and racial hatred – Pring considers a similar claim with the example of segregated schooling in Northern Ireland (2004, p.54). Rather than attempt to remedy inequalities between faith schools, perhaps we should understand these inequalities to be a manifestation of deeper religious hostilities: the removal of faith schools would restrict a crucial way in which these underlying religious hostilities are instilled into children. The National Secular Society claims that “separating children along such fundamental lines of difference is divisive and leads to religious, ethnic and socio-economic segregation” (2020). In short, faith schools can be viewed as both a product and cause of inter-faith tensions that are counter-productive to the pluralist goal of amicable relations between diverse groups.
Thirdly, I return to the earlier premise (P1) – that a right to freedom of religion equates to a right to a religious education. Secularists would likely maintain that religious education is outside of state remit: “parents are entitled to raise their children within a faith tradition, but they are not entitled to enlist the help of the state to do so” (National Secular Society, 2020). Support for this reasoning can be found in both legislation and political theory. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office declared that:
“the state is not obliged to actively participate or provide resources to assist parents in such religious education; parents do not have a right to state funding for confessional religious teaching or religious schools that are in line with their own beliefs” (FCO, 2016).
Pring also considers the claim that “the nurturing of faith is not an educational task” (2004, p.55). Denise Meyerson deploys the principle of state neutrality to declare that religion belongs firmly in the private realm. Based on the principle of “citizen’s equal moral status” in civic realms (p.46, 2008), Rawls’ “highly sophisticated” (ibid.) modernisation of Lockean theory is presented:
“When the limited powers of human reason are exercised within a framework of free institutions, ‘a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result’ (Rawls, 1993, p.xvi). Rawls calls this the fact of ‘reasonable pluralism’ (ibid. p.36)”. (Meyerson, 2008, p.47)
Concurrently, Rawls maintains that state neutrality is a “basic political principle which all reasonable people can be expected to endorse” (ibid.). The crucial implication of this being that the state “does not prefer religion over non-religion” (ibid.). Meyerson goes on to include the promotion of religion in state schools as an exemplary case of a violation of the principle of state neutrality (p.53).
Finally, the opponent of state-funded faith schools can emphasise the strength of the inclusive secular model (Lichten, 2019). “Constructive” religious pluralism may be developed through secular religious education (King, 2010, p.283), facilitating “a common learning culture which fosters inclusiveness” with liberty, respect, and rationality (Gardner, 2004, p.10). An “epistemologically open way” (ibid.) of educating our children in line with modern plurality involves educating children as “subjects in their own culture” (Skeie, 1995, p.90). Pring claims that John Dewey (whose ideals were central to Roegholt et al’s (1998) pluralist approach) would support an internally diverse “common school” (2004, p.53). In other words, the secular inclusive model is perhaps more proficient in facilitating the “tradition of criticism” that is instrumental to a liberal education (Preng, 2004, p.57), thereby developing children’s pluralistic attitude.
Tension 2: Conclusion
In summary, it is clear that there are compelling reasons on either side of the faith school debate. Interestingly, both sides appeal to pluralism in some form or another – so how do they reach polar conclusions? Yet again, the distinction between pluralism in forms (a) and (b) is valuable.
Value pluralism (b), with its deontological themes, is a philosophy that prioritises the protection of religious groups’ right to educate children as they wish. This supports faith schools, emphasising the rights of various divergent groups and their respective values. The Hickian framework that I deployed supports the multiplicity of distinct faith practices, viewing each unique theological path as something highly valuable. Under this religious pluralist model, I believe the right to religious education through faith schools, if seen as a sub‑category of the universal right to freedom of expression, is too stringent to be violated.
On the contrary, if we emphasise pluralism as a virtuous attitude (a) – using schooling to encourage children to be more pluralist in character – then I believe different results follow. There is notable evidence of faith schools as a means through which broader religious, racial, and ethnic tensions can be manifested; additionally, it seems that an inclusive secular model will expose all children to a wider range of faiths and encourage inter-faith dialogue and respect. If we want diversity to be a source of cohesion in schools, then pluralism as an attitude would embrace the fact that the “inevitability of diversity is also a medium for people to study social life so they will get to know one another” (Salim, 2013, p.127). In short, if we understand pluralism as a virtuous attitude, then faith schools should be, at the very least, heavily restricted.
Conclusion
This essay has used the framework of pluralism, understood in various forms, to critically evaluate two tensions relating to children in schools. Noting the distinction between a) the pluralistic attitude, and b) value pluralism, was central to my analysis.
The first tension discussed the proposal of a decolonial curriculum. In support of this proposal, I demonstrated that a decolonial approach is more pluralist in its methods, encouraging children to develop a pluralistic attitude. Further, the likely reduction of racial/ ethnic marginalisation furthers the decolonial approach’s strength as a pluralist approach. The supposed anti-liberal presentism is a notable point, but one that is not weighty enough to undermine the proposal.
The second tension explored the debate surrounding state-funded faith schools. With strong claims on either side, both of which appeal to pluralism in form (a) or (b), I believe either stance can be reasonably held in a plural society.
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