Small Actions. Big Problems.

Photo: Heathrow, July 2018

Preface

We are all guilty of it. It's all too tempting to reflect on our actions and question how we could possibly make a difference. We are constantly told that issues such as climate collapse and increasing voter turnout are only solvable if everyone collectively acts and does the right thing. Individual actions seem too small to make a difference. I wrote this essay as my coursework piece for Moral Philosophy. I can only hope that a more formally written essay can still get to the heart of everyday issues and persuade you to do the right thing, even if it feels like you don't make a difference - in fact, you help far more than you know.

Introduction

The Problem of Collective Impact (PCI) is a moral conundrum because individual actions are often (ostensibly) too small to make a difference; if many people justify their action/inaction via this intuition, then morally condemnable outcomes result.

This essay argues individual action within collective harm cases is morally wrong. I present two explanations for this moral assessment: Nefsky’s work informs both. The first develops what I call her ‘underlying dimensions’ theory; I argue this theory, in combination with an objective list theory of wellbeing/illbeing, offers one solution to the PCI. However, the latter of these two explanations is, in my view, more promising. It represents Nefsky’s own view; she argues that one can help without making a difference. Nefsky’s moral assessment derives from this concept of helping.

The essay structure is as follows:

Firstly, I present my construction of the PCI through a Sorites-style paradox, featuring claims (A), (B) and (C). The main body of the essay presents and evaluates four options to solve the paradox:

i. reject only (A)

ii. reject only (B)

iii. reject (C)

iv. Nefsky’s Theory

Options (i) and (ii) will be shown as inadequate. Discussion regarding option (iii) will develop into my hybrid solution: Nefsky’s underlying dimensions theory in conjunction with objective list theory. Option (iv) is Nefsky’s own position. Finally, I will explore Fanciullo’s response to Nefsky and explain why it’s mistaken.

Sorites Paradox Construction of the PCI

Paradoxes occur when ostensibly correct claims are codified together which collectively form unacceptable outcome(s). Paradox arguments use the unacceptability of the outcome to argue that at least one of the claims should, in fact, be rejected. I chose to present the PCI in paradox format because firstly, I believe it captures an important point; the PCI is a moral conundrum because it leads to a slippery slope. Secondly, this format allows me to clearly present my two distinct solutions.

The Problem of Collective Impact:

(A) it makes no perceptible difference to outcome Y if one person does action X

(B) it makes a perceptible difference to outcome Y if many people do action X

(C) No Small Improvement (NSI): in collective impact cases, the net increase/decrease of one person doing action X makes no perceptible difference to outcome Y

Each claim alone seems correct, but together, a contradictory outcome occurs:

P1. 1 person X-ing makes no perceptible difference to outcome Y

P2. 2 people X-ing makes no perceptible difference to outcome Y

Pn+1. etc.

P10bil. 10 billion people X-ing makes no perceptible difference to outcome Y

The paradox has valid structure. P1 embodies claim (A). The inference P1→P2 is facilitated by claim (C): the No Small Improvement principle of tolerance. This process of inference is made repeatedly until premises such as (P10bil.) follow. Such premises contradict claim (B). This contradiction compels us to reject at least one of the initial claims.

Solving the Paradox (i) – Reject only (A)

The obvious solution rejects claim (A) – this would swiftly debunk the PCI with some account of how individuals really are making a morally relevant difference towards outcome Y.

However, before even considering accounts of difference-making, I note that in the context of my construction, it is erroneous to reject claim only (A). Rejecting only (A) and thus maintaining (C) is necessarily self-defeating: (C) logically depends on (A). (C) is a claim about how significant the difference is between two adjacent states of affairs in which the net difference is 1 unit (e.g. P2→P3). Any such claim relies on a claim about the significance of 1 unit. (A) is this claim. Solution (i) is therefore a dead-end.

Solving the Paradox (ii) – Reject only (B)

To reject only claim (B) would be clearly flawed. In all collective impact cases (both fictional and non-fictional), it is clear the collective force of vast numbers of individual actions does cause significant impact (see Parfit, 1984, p.80). Claim (B) is the bedrock of this discussion.

Solving the Paradox (iii) – Reject (C)

For Kagan among others, rejecting NSI is the solution. Rejecting NSI solves the PCI by preventing the process of inference between premises such as (P1) and (P10bil.). Kagan therefore argues that individual acts make a morally significant difference (Kagan, 2011), even if very minor. Kagan defines morally significant acts in two distinct ways for threshold/non-threshold cases[1].

Threshold: for each possible outcome Y, there is some specific number of actions X required to bring it about.

Non-threshold: there is no specific number of actions X that bring about distinctly different outcomes Y. Involves gradual structure with no apparent boundaries.

For Kagan, in threshold cases, an individual’s act is morally significant if there is at least a chance that the act will make a difference; one can effectively respond “using the familiar appeal to Expected Utility” (Kagan, 2011, pp.117-129). This use of game theory allows low probability outcomes to demand proportionately high obligation if the outcome is significant (e.g. being the winning vote in a large election). Expected Utility theory is convincing prima facie, so I set aside this discussion, instead focusing on Kagan’s problematic response to non-threshold imperceptibility cases.

Non-threshold imperceptibility cases are more challenging since there is no probability that the act will cause harm: Expected Utility theory is inapt here. Moreover, Kagan accepts the consequentialist cannot simply assert there is harm; there needs to be something actually harmful about it (Nefsky, 2011, p.373). Kagan equates harm to perceptible change: the notion of imperceptible harm is therefore flawed. Imperceptible harm isn’t ‘real harm’ because “what is bad about pain is its qualitative perceptual aspect” (Kagan, 2011, p.129). Kagan accordingly dismisses non-threshold cases:

“to claim that individual acts either do or might make a morally significant difference in all collective impact cases is to claim there are no non-threshold cases.”

(Nefsky, 2017, p.2748)

However, Kagan’s position is problematic. Nefsky argues Kagan too quickly dismisses non-threshold cases: she distinguishes perceptible change from change to the underlying dimension:

“there may be differences… that, while imperceptible, are genuine differences for the worse… each act makes an imperceptible difference along the underlying dimension.”

(Nefsky, 2011, pp.373-4)

In other words, in non-threshold imperceptible difference cases, even if the subject(s) perceive no disparity between adjacent states of affairs, there is still a real objective difference between them. This ‘underlying dimensions’ theory explains non-threshold cases, while avoiding the implications of claim (C).

The following is not how Nefsky tackles the PCI, but I offer another solution by combining ‘underlying dimensions theory’ with an objective list approach. If the change to the underlying dimension in the scenario directly corresponds to an item of wellbeing/illbeing on an objective list, then the moral rightness/wrongness of the act can be associated to objective change(s) caused by the act, thus accommodating imperceptibility cases.

e.g. Pollution[2]:

S produces an additional 5L of CO2. This microscopic change increases C’s tumour by 0.01% in size. Assuming tumours are objectively unhealthy, an objective list theory that equates healthiness to wellbeing and vice versa declares S’s actions as morally wrong, regardless of C’s ability to perceive the +0.01%.

Although this view is reasonably compelling, I do not present this argument as my central solution. Doing so requires advocating objective list theories. I contend that if we assume the soundness of objective list theories, then this strategy would be effective. The most promising solution to the PCI remains Nefsky’s own approach.

Solving the Paradox (iv) – Helping Without Making A Difference

Nefsky, rather than reject any of the claims of the paradox, reasons towards a different account for moral assessments in PCI cases:

“The assumption is helping to bring about an outcome requires making a difference… the key to solving the problem is to reject this assumption.”

(Nefsky, 2017, p.2743)

Nefsky defines helping as a non-superfluous causal contribution; this informs our moral assessments in collective harm cases (Nefsky, 2017, pp.2752-3). Action X is helpful iff:

i. it is possible that outcome Y will occur

ii. it is possible that outcome Y will not occur

iii. it is possible that outcome Y will not occur due to a lack of action X

These conditions capture an important aspect of Nefsky’s thinking: an action is non-superfluous in the context of an ‘open possibility’ i.e. the outcome is not predetermined – it’s still ‘up in the air’. Moreover, the individual action is relevant because it is possible the outcome will not occur because of a lack of said action. To exemplify Nefsky’s account, reconsider Parfit’s Drops of Water:

"The Drops of Water. A large number of wounded men lie out in the desert, suffering from intense thirst. We are an equally large number of altruists, each of whom has a pint of water. We could pour these pints into a water‐ cart. This would be driven into the desert, and our water would be shared equally between all these many wounded men. By adding his pint, each of us would enable each wounded man to drink slightly more water—perhaps only an extra drop. Even to a very thirsty man, each of these extra drops would be a very small benefit. The effect on each man might even be imperceptible."

(Parfit, p.9, 1984)

Adding the individual pint is the morally good thing to do, because it makes a non-superfluous causal contribution to a morally favourable, undetermined potential outcome (the quenching of the dying men’s thirst). I find Nefsky’s account very compelling in PCI cases.

Fanciullo’s Objection

I categorise Fanciullo’s objection into two sections. Section one presents an altered version of Drops of Water, which aims to demonstrate the ‘pointlessness’ of acting even if Nefsky states the action is helpful. In section two, Fanciullo states section one can be resolved, but with unacceptable implications.

“One Mechanism: Your situation is just as it is in Drops of Water, expect now there are no other altruists. Instead, there is a mechanism that will either release 9,999 pints of water into the cart, or it will not. You are just as confident that the mechanism will add the water as you are that, in Drops of Water, enough other altruists will add their water”

(Fanciullo, 2019, p.8)

Nefsky’s account argues we can help, since her three conditions are met, yet in either outcome, Fanciullo argues it’s “utterly pointless” (Fanciullo, 2019, p.8) to contribute. If the mechanism releases the water, then one additional pint will do nothing to relieve the suffering. If the mechanism does not release, then one pint will likewise do nothing to relieve the suffering of the people. Fanciullo attempts to trivialise the significance of the one pint by supposing another entity has control over 99.99% of the outcome.

I argue One Mechanism is irrelevant because it is not a PCI. The reason that individual action is ostensibly pointless in PCI cases is because of the vast number of others involved. One Mechanism does not count as a collective harm case because the individual’s significance is trivialised by a different reason: the vast inequality in capability to contribute. Although this is also a fascinating moral issue, I don’t consider it a PCI.

Fanciullo’s second case is a PCI:

“9,999 Mechanisms: Your situation is just as it is in One Mechanism, except now… there are 9,999 mechanisms, each of which will either release a pint of water into the cart, or it will not. You are just as confident that enough mechanisms will add their water… as you are that, in Drops of Water, enough other altruists will add their water.”

(Fanciullo, 2019, p.10)

Fanciullo argues that since mechanisms do not ‘act’, Nefsky’s third condition isn’t met. Therefore, under Nefsky’s account, one cannot help in 9,999 Mechanisms, even though it perfectly mirrors the structure of the original Drops of Water, in which we can help. Fanciullo’s argument aims to highlight inconsistency.

I see no reason why the 9,999 mechanisms could not be said to be acting. I define ‘to act’ as ‘to behave in the stated way’. Since the mechanisms behave in the stated way, the third condition is met. I see no morally relevant difference between 9,999 Mechanisms and Drops of Water.

Conclusion

I have presented two solutions to the PCI and therefore maintain that individual action in collective harm cases is morally wrong. My first solution combines Nefsky’s underlying dimensions theory with objective list theory; consequently, actions causing imperceptible differences can possess moral force. The latter solution is Nefsky’s view, which I defended against Fanciullo’s objections. Fanciullo’s first case does not qualify as a PCI. I reject Fanciullo’s reasoning in the second case by maintaining that his mechanisms can ‘act’.

Footnotes

[1] Kagan calls these triggering/non-triggering cases, synonymously to how I use threshold/non-threshold

[2] health as a feature of an objective list can be adapted to other non-threshold cases e.g. Harmless Torturers or Drops of Water.

Bibliography

Fanciullo, J., (2019), What is the point of helping? Philosophical Studies, 1-14, forthcoming

Kagan, S., (2011), Do I make a difference? Philosophy & Public Affairs

Nefsky, J., (2017), How you can help, without making a difference, Philosophical Studies, 174(11)

Nefsky, J., (2011), Consequentialism and the problem of collective harm: A reply to Kagan, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 39

Parfit, D., (1984), Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Further Reading

Barnett, Z., (2017), No free lunch: The significance of tiny contributions, Analysis, 78(1)